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Abstract: Terrorism financing is one of the most complex problems the democratic world is facing 
today. The transfer of funds to support terrorist activities has created enormous challenges across the 
world. This has fuelled several inter-religious and nationalist hate, and as such has put many nations 
into war with terrorist organisations. The main objective of this study is to review the sources of 
terrorist financing. The paper relies on secondary data that were drawn from various books, journals, 
as well as from institutional materials relevant to the issues raised. It concludes that terrorists are 
exploiting established financial systems at the global level to move their finances, and that informal 
systems remain the biggest challenge to thwart terrorist activities.  
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1. Introduction 
Terrorism has a global reach, in terms of its activities and funding sources. Money 
is the engine that propels terrorist activities. A vital aspect of the global “war on 
terror” over the past decade has been the fight against financing terrorism 
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(Raphael, 2003). According to Interpol (2007), “the frequency and severity of acts 
of international terrorism are often proportional to the financing that terrorists may 
obtain, so it is important that law enforcements target sponsors who make the 
financing of terrorist activities, and not just the perpetrators or actual terrorist acts”. 
Elaborating on the importance of combating terrorism financing, Ayers (2002) 
states that the war on terror should be fought in the halls of our financial 
institutions and cannot be won from the destruction of the site of the battle. Since 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in America (11/9), threats from 
international terrorist networks have assumed a more international dimension, thus 
posing a major challenge to international peace and security (Krieger & Meieriks, 
2011). In response to the events of 9/11, the US and indeed the international 
community launched a war against terrorism in many respects, of which one of the 
greatest agendas was to go after terrorist financing in what is called “the next war 
against terrorism” (Heng & McDonagh, 2008). 
Despite the many efforts to end terrorism, the international community still 
grapples with the complex realities. We have witnessed many causalities in recent 
years, and terrorism continuously threatens the relevant values endorsed by the 
democratic world (Bantekas, 2003). The purpose of this research is to review the 
sources of terrorism funding, methods and channels of movement of terrorist 
finances.  
 
2. Literature Review 
While it is essential to have an understanding of what terrorism really means, 
before we talk about how it is financed and fought, it is essential to note that the 
search for an inclusive definition from an academic, political or international legal 
perspective has continued for decades and continues to this day, notwithstanding 
that the practice has gained much more prominence in the last two decades as one 
of the greatest threats to international peace and security. Jenkins (1980), stressed 
that “terrorism has become part of our daily diet of news ... the phenomenon of 
terrorism has become a growing concern for governments and increasing interest 
for researchers.” 
The difficulty of finding a universal definition according to Schmid (2004) is 
because terrorism has been put- and thus, implicitly defined- in different contexts 
such as crime, politics, war, propaganda and religion. Depending on the frames we 
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choose, it exposes some aspects of terrorism, while others are located “outside 
image” if only a frame is utilized. After reviewing some 109 definitions of 
terrorism, Schmid and Jongman (1988) have identified 22 recurrent elements in the 
various definitions, and tried to incorporate them into a consensus definition: 
“Terrorism is a method anxiety inspired to action repeat violent, employing 
individuals, groups or actors (semi) state clandestinely, for ideological reasons, 
criminal or political, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of 
violence are not the main targets.” 
Immediate human victims of violence are chosen at random (usually targets of 
opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target 
population, and serve as generators massage. Processes based on threats and 
violence communication between terrorist (organization), (risk) victim, and targets 
the key used to manipulate the main target (audience), turning it into a target of 
terror, a target requirement, or a target of attention, depending on whether 
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.  
Cash in terrorists’ hands is money that kills. If radical ideology and extremism are 
at the heart of terrorism today, finance is the life-blood. The threat of so-called 
“new terrorism” is not the only challenge that terrorists might pose, but also their 
ability to buy and to use relevant weapons through innovation, and meeting 
complex funds and techniques to transfer those funds (Acharya, 2009). 
Although the actual costs of specific terrorist acts can be relatively inexpensive for 
strategic attacks, terrorist organisations require much higher budgets for general 
operation (Freeman, 2011). Above all, terrorist groups often need money to fund 
operations, infrastructure, equipment and logistics, because as with all human 
efforts, terrorism successful requires resources (Gordon & Rossman, 2009). Thus, 
access to funds transfer channels is essential for feeding terrorist organisations and 
decisive in the formulation and implementation of their activities (Acharya, 2009). 
Stressing the importance of financing terrorist organisations, Ayers (2002) argues 
that, “Terrorists cannot terrorize without money, without resources. The training 
cost money, planning costs money, and explosives have cost, plane tickets cost 
money.” This is further supported by the international Criminal Police 
Organization (INTERPOL, 2007), which states that “the frequency and severity of 
international terrorist acts are often proportional to the financing that terrorists may 
obtain. The following estimates show that terrorist groups especially those larger 
and more proactive, have budgets that can go into hundreds of millions of dollars a 
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year” (Freeman, 2011). Al Qaeda's annual budget was estimated at 30 million US 
dollars (Passas, 2006); until shortly after the end of the Cold War, the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) had an annual budget of about $ 15 million (Horgan & 
Taylor, 1999). At the height of its activities in the 1990s, the Kurdish Workers 
Party (PKK) had a budget of $ 86 million (Roth & Sever, 2010); Hezbollah's 
annual budget is estimated at $ 100 million to 200 million and could be as high as $ 
400 million (Levitt, 2004). 
 
3. Methodology  
This research paper is conducted using secondary data, as it better fits the nature 
and purpose of the study. The data are drawn from a pool of very credible sources 
from respectable scholars and international institutions that deal with the 
phenomenon of financing of terrorist activities. Moreover, this research adopts 
narrative analysis to meet the relevant research goals and objectives.  
 
4. Analysis 
According to Navias (2002), the fight against the financing of terrorism is “a form 
of economic war, the context of which the global financial markets is and whose 
purpose is to limit the capacity of the enemy as to generate funds and to move 
money across borders for the support and maintenance purposes of international 
operation”.  
Although the UK (as one of the first countries to realise the need to focus on 
activities that provide finance for terrorist organisations) established the “Terrorist 
Financing Unit” in response to a change in the modus operandi of IRA's activities 
in early 1980s (Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007), before 11 September 2001, little 
international attention was given to the financing of terrorism. Winer (2008) notes, 
for example, that before September 11, not a single country in the Middle East had 
control of the Financing of Terrorism, and even the US believe that “had the best 
ways to prevent terrorist attacks” (Roth & Sever, 2010).  
In the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, the US launched a number of wars against 
terrorism. Some of the first moves included the passing of the Patriot Act and the 
targeting of terrorist financing by blocking financial transactions and freezing of 
assets of individuals and organisations allegedly related to terrorism (McCulloch & 
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Pickering, 2005). According to Taylor (2005), the rationale for Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism is “hatred puts gasoline to terrorism, but money makes the 
schemes deadly accessible. By breaking the backbone of financial terrorist groups 
and insurgents, we can prevent ambitions for the short term dismantling their long-
term agendas. Termination of funds that helps terrorists can lead to the ultimate 
destruction of the terrorist organizations. With the prevalence and magnitude of 
terrorist attacks which is often proportional to the funding available to them, it is 
important that law enforcement aim financial sponsors of terrorist activities, not 
only the actual perpetrators of terrorist acts” (Interpol, 2007). 
4.1. Sources of Financing of Terrorism 
There are different views expressed by researchers on how terrorists raise funds. 
Harmon (2008), who rightly points out that this in itself is “organized, diverse, and 
dimension sometimes complex terrorist operations”. Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) 
are of the opinion that terrorist groups acquire financial resources primarily from 
(i) state funding (ii) financing legitimate means (e.g. by legitimate business, 
charities, support diaspora etc.), and (iii) private financing by illegal means, usually 
including a full criminal activity (bank robberies, drug trafficking, kidnapping, 
extortion). 
In a slightly different context, Bell (2003) and Acharya (2009) suggest five models 
of financial resources of terrorists: state sponsoring model, popular support model, 
entrepreneur model, model of criminal proceeds and model of cybercrime 
financing. 
4.1.1. State Funding Model 
This is a situation where terrorist groups rely on state funding. This was 
particularly common in the era of the Cold War, where competing countries use 
terrorism as a deliberate instrument of foreign policy (Acharya, 2009). Funding of 
state terrorism mainly happens when goals (strategic and tactical) state sponsor 
coincide with sponsored groups, such as financing the group Western European 
terrorist movements and Third World liberation by the Soviet Union and its allies 
during the Cold War (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011). Although this form of terrorism 
has declined since the 1990s, countries such as Iran and Syria are still active 
sponsors of terrorism (Freeman, 2011). 
4.1.2. Popular Support Model 
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Almost every terrorist group or network enjoys support from some form of 
community types, whether domestic or extra-territorial (Acharya, 2009). Such 
support, logistical or monetary, is often based on a common identity, either 
religious, ethnic or ideological, and comes from charitable donations, members of 
the diaspora, as well as from membership fees and direct donations from members 
(Freeman, 2011). Be it from individuals or charitable organisations, charity has 
become one of the main means of raising revenue for terrorist groups with funds 
being collected from donors who are or are not aware that they are donating 
towards the financing of terrorism (Bantekas, 2003; Freeman, 2011). 
The financing of terrorist groups and activities of diaspora communities attributed 
to the fact that when found out, the diaspora is interested in what is happening in 
their countries (Harmon, 2008). Making a withdrawal distinguishable between this 
form of funding and charitable donations, Freeman (2011) notes that, the support of 
the diaspora is based more on ethnic or racial connections and less religious. 
4.1.3. Entrepreneur Model  
One of evidence of the complexities of terrorism financing is that terrorists also 
operate under an umbrella of legitimacy, holding, management and running 
legitimate businesses and commercial enterprises to raise finances and also to 
move them (Biersteker & Eckert, 2008). These corporate cover consist of real 
estate, import-export and car sales companies, high-tech laboratories, shipping, 
civil engineering and financial construction companies. Financial firms and 
investment banks, and even trade in commodities such as precious metals and 
gems, provide cover for terrorist organisations, facilitate logistics and also generate 
profits that are channelled in the end to terrorism (Harmon, 2008). 
Al Qaeda, for example in the 1990s, had several legitimate businesses such as 
farms, various trading companies, a tannery, construction, manufacturing and 
investment companies such as in Sudan, and elsewhere (Freeman, 2011). Osama 
Bin Laden himself had set-up a number of businesses under a holding company 
named Wadi al-Aqiq, reportedly owned by a merchant ship, and had invested $50 
million in a Sudanese bank (Acharya, 2009). 
4.1.4. Model of Criminal Proceeds  
The increased level of combat on the finances of global terrorism by various state 
and international organisations has pushed terrorist organisations to get 
increasingly involved in illegal financing activities (Bantekas, 2003). This often 
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happens when terrorist groups are no longer able to attract (or when they lose) 
support for their causes (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011). This attraction to crime is 
further strengthened by the existence of a symbiotic dynamic link between 
transnational crime and terrorist organisations (Acharya, 2009). Terrorist 
involvement in criminal activities extend from drugs trafficking in human beings, 
fraud, robbery, extortion, smuggling, oil theft, forgery, money laundering (Raphael, 
2003). 
4.1.5. Model of Cybernetic Financing 
The growth of information and communication technologies in recent decades has 
offered both opportunities for economic development and promote their fear of 
attracting crimes (Zerzan, 2010).This is especially true for the Internet, which has 
become a key tool for terrorists communication, radicalisation, recruitment and 
training, and for the establishment and movement of funds (Acharya, 2009). 
Terrorists are increasingly becoming involved in cyber-crimes such as identity 
theft, credit card fraud, money laundering etc., to raise funds; also, they sometimes 
do this online via a direct request (Kemal, 2014). In a prayer on their website, the 
Global Jihad, for example, seeks donations to facilitate the growth of various jihadi 
movements around the world by supplying them with sufficient funds to buy 
weapons and train individuals (Kiser, 2005). The other aspect of cyber funding that 
is rapidly expanding, is cleaning and moving money online using money transfer 
and new technology payments, as banks and other financial institutions are offering 
their customers financial services online (Acharya, 2009). 
4.2. Methods and Channels of Moving Terrorist Finances 
For terrorist organisations, unlike criminal organisations, the need to disburse 
money is greater than the need to collect them (Acharya, 2009). In this way, 
terrorists keep trying to come up with new techniques to transfer funds and 
improve existing methods with the ultimate aim of avoiding detection (Gomez, 
2010). The terrorists and their cohorts have developed more channels to identify 
the movement of funds across the world (Tofangsaz, 2015) – ranging from money 
laundering to the use of formal and informal systems of money transfer, internet, 
business, personal courier, charities, religious organisations and even diplomatic 
channels. Some of these are highlighted below: 
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4.2.1. Money Laundering 
Money laundering is considered one of the biggest obstacles to maintaining an 
effective operating international financial system (Buchanan, 2014). Money 
laundering is a two-dimensional source for terrorist organisations. It is also a tool 
to raise money and also a tool to move them. According to the World Bank (2003), 
“Money laundering is the process by which revenues derived from criminal activity 
(i.e., the offense) are disguised in an attempt to disguise the origin of their situation 
and to legitimize the use in the future”. Although the financing of terrorism and 
money laundering are synergistic, in that terrorists and criminals use similar types 
of transactions that involve the use of inactive companies and deliveries of secret 
money, a lot of measures against money laundering have been expanded in the 
fight against the financing of terrorism. 
While terrorism financing includes supporting terrorism through the injection of 
funds (legally or illegally earned) money laundering involves converting the money 
earned illegally into legitimate funds (Naheem, 2016). Terrorist financing is also 
referred to as “the opposite of money laundering” because it includes funding for 
the commission of crime and money laundering or illegally acquired funds includes 
crime (SIB, 2010). 
4.2.2. Financial Formal Systems 
Although security measures in the formal banking system is currently high, 
nonetheless, terrorists have used and continue to use the defects in the system. The 
September 11 attacks was for instance funded through a complex series of bank 
accounts, credit and debit cards, as well as international remittances and transfers 
from bank to bank (Acharya, 2009). 
Terrorists not only rely on Western banks but also  make enough use of Islamic 
banks, which operation are led under Islamic jurisprudence, and in some cases, 
terrorists or their financiers have controlling interests in banks (Brisard & 
Martinez, 2014). Osama bin Laden, for example utilised the Sudanese Bank Al 
Shamal Islam, in which he held a controlling interest. The bank had correspondent 
agreement with large banks across Europe and North America to transfer money to 
the account of an operative of Al-Qaida in the Bank of America, which was used to 
buy a small plane (Gomez, 2010). 
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It is pertinent to note however, that, except in cases where the banks are controlled 
by terrorist organisations or their financial facilitators, most financial institutions 
are not aware that terrorist financing flows through their network. 
4.2.3. Informal Systems of Funds Transfer 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, authorities around the world came 
under intense pressure to tighten the regulation and supervision of funds transfer 
systems, especially to review relevant processes which operated outside of 
conventional financial systems. Special emphasis was placed on the Hawala system 
because of its alleged role in financing illegal as well as terrorist activities (El-
Qorchi, 2002). Hawala, which literally means “transfer” in Arabic, is essentially a 
form of “money transfer without moving money” (INTERPOL, 2002). It involves 
the transfer of money between a sender and recipients in every part of the world, 
using an intermediary known as Hawalader that takes money, and another 
Hawalader guides in the host country to pay the beneficiary for the amount 
transferred. It is characterised essentially by trust and the extensive use of alloys 
such as family relationships or regional affiliations. Hawala is found to be so 
vulnerable to abuse by terrorist organisations (Raphael 2003; Interpol, 2002), such 
that it has been dubbed “a banking system built on terrorism” (Time, 2001). 
Terrorists have managed easily to move large amounts of money without recourse 
of the formal banking system in order to finance their operations (Schramm & 
Taube, 2003). 
 
5. Conclusion 
The fight against terror financing is a continuous battle and remains a challenge for 
many states and international institutions. Terrorists have greatly evolved their 
means of functioning and many times are ahead of law enforcement mechanisms.  
The objective of this paper was to review the sources of terrorist financing and the 
relevant ways in which terrorists transfer funds. It was indicated in this study that, 
the recent advancements in technology has provided an effective tool for terrorists 
to communicate, unite, and to create platforms in order to conduct their missions 
effectively in regards to money transfer. We can conclude that formal financial 
systems still provides opportunities for terrorists to transfer money because of the 
inherent flaws. A greater supervision and control is imperative to prevent their 
activities. The biggest challenge will remain the supervision of the informal system 
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of money transfer. It will be very hard and sometimes might prove to be an 
impossible mission to monitor, given the specific way in which terrorists operate.  
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